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Abstract— This paper presents the design and implementa-
tion of an assisted control technology for a small multirotor
platform for aerial inspection of fixed energy infrastructure.
Sensor placement is supported by a theoretical analysis of ex-
pected sensor performance and constrained platform behaviour
to speed up implementation. The optical sensors provide relative
position information between the platform and the asset, which
enables human operator inputs to be autonomously adjusted
to ensure safe separation. The assisted control approach is
designed to reduced operator workload during close proximity
inspection tasks, with collision avoidance and safe separation
managed autonomously. The energy infrastructure includes sin-
gle vertical wooden poles and crossarm with attached overhead
wires. Simulated and real experimental results are provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
The manual operation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)
for the purpose of close proximity inspection of infrastructure
is becoming increasingly common. However, precise manual
piloting of these platforms when undertaking inspections is
a challenging task due to the pilot’s difficulty in maintaining
awareness and precise offset control of the UAV relative
to the infrastructure. This requires highly skilled pilots to
be located in close proximity to the asset. These aspects
limit the efficiency and impedes potential value that could
be realised from a UAV-based approach for infrastructure
inspection. To address pilot limitations, attention is shifting
towards robotic solutions mainly to provide the capability of
obstacle avoidance and path planning.
The majority of approaches to collision avoidance focus
on full autonomy. However, in practice, an assisted auton-
omy solution is more palatable to regulators and also more
desirable to end users. From the regulatory point of view, an
assisted autonomous control system will have a human-in-
the-loop which defines responsibilities and it is considered
as a fail-safe against full autonomous control failure. From
the end user point of view, it allows an expert operator to
focus on hard-to-detect defects in the infrastructure without
worrying about collisions.
This work addresses the task of inspecting electrical
pole infrastructure using an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV),
Fig. 1. The aim is to maintain a safety buffer zone to the
electrical pole in order to increase the safety of the operation
and improve the quality of collected data and also to reduce
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Fig. 1. Example Flight trial showing the multirotor (DJIS800) and sensor
rig (Intel NUC, Two RealSense cameras) inspecting an unenergized power
pole, crossarm and wire configuration in Queensland, Australia.
the pilot cognitive load and reduce the level of pilot skill
required for close proximity pole inspection.
The contributions of this paper are:
I A theoretical analysis of expected sensor performance and
constrained platform behaviour.
I A light weight vision only, computationally efficient ap-
proach to electrical pole detection and avoidance.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II provides
some background on UAVs for autonomous inspection. Sec-
tion III presents the operational concept for assisted inspec-
tion of power infrastructure. Section IV provides an overview
of the hardware and software selection for perception. ection
V describes the assisted control approach whilst Section
VI provides simulated and real experimental results for a
multirotor inspecting a fixed power pole. Section VII offers
concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
The majority of work on infrastructure inspection focus on
the autonomous aspect of the problem, as shown in recent
survey by Máthé et al. [1]. The assumption is that the data
recorded during the autonomous operation can be processed
offline by experts as in the case of railway semaphore
inspection [2], wind turbine inspection [3] and power line
inspection [?]. However, an autonomous inspection requires
the use of an expert system onboard the UAV that replaces
the human expert and can steer the platform towards poten-
tially defective parts of the asset. This is possible in the case
of simple structures, such as power lines [4], but not always
possible when the structure is complex or the type of defect
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is unknown. In these cases a human expert is needed to steer
the platform.
Assisted autonomy of UAV focuses on reducing the pos-
sibility of collisions during missions. This can be done
in a passive or an active way. Passively, the assistance is
performed by directing the pilot using external forces through
a haptic control device as demonstrated in [5], [6], [7].
Whereas the active approach works by altering the direction
and magnitude of the operators input velocity [8], usually
to ensure collision free motion when operating in close
proximity to obstacles (e.g power infrastructure in the case
of this work). Typically, the motivation behind this is so that
the UAV maintains smooth and continuous motion during
operation leading to improved data collection.
However, in an assisted inspection mission, the operator
often wants to position the platform such that a particular
view of the infrastructure can be examined clearly, without
accidentally causing a collision. In this case, it is undesirable
to alter the direction of the controller input, instead we sim-
ply modify the magnitude such that the robot never breaches
a predefined inner collision boundary. This paper proposes
an approach to achieve this type of assisted autonomy for
infrastructure inspection.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
A position vector is denoted by a single point p(x, y, z),
where x, y and z are the scalar displacements of the point
from an earth fixed reference coordinate frame FR with
origin OR. A tilde is used to denote a requested control input
from the operator such that u˜ and u˜ represent vector and
scalar control inputs respectively. Unless otherwise stated,
SI units are assumed.
The bounding polygon ∂S of a finite point set S ∈ R2 is
the set of points in the closure of S, not belonging to the
interior of S . The bounding polyhedra ∂V of a finite point
set V ∈ R3 is the set of points in the closure of V , not
belonging to the interior of V .
B. Infrastructure Parameters
Assumptions regarding the infrastructure are as follows:
1. Each pole has a height hp and radius rp such that 6 ≤
hp ≤ 10 and 0.2 ≤ rp ≤ 0.4. If a pole is not cylindrical, it
can be modelled as a cylinder. The approximating cylinder
encloses all edges of the pole and provides an upper
bound of the pole size. Each pole is located at the position
pp which denotes the point where the centreline of the
approximating cylinder intersects the ground plane. Pole
tilt is no more than 5◦ from the z axis in FR.
2. Each pole has a single cross arm attached to the top of the
pole at point pc such that the centre of the crossarm and
the pole coincide. The crossarm has a radius rc measured
from pc to either end of the crossarm such that 0.5 ≤
rc ≤ 2. The crossarm resides at height hp and has an
orientation ψc ∈ (0, 2pi) measured from the x axis of
FR. The crossarm is assumed to be perpendicular to the
pole with unknown orientation.
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Fig. 2. 3D pole, crossarm and wire () geometry and parameters including
example protection zones () and arbitrarily located platform.
3. Each pole has an circular crossarm region ∂S centred
on pc with radius rc where the crossarm may be located.
Crossarm ∂Sc and pole ∂Sp detection regions are defined
as the intersection of the sensor field of view and the
circular crossarm region ∂S.
4. Incoming and outgoing linear wires wi where i ∈
{1, . . . , 4} are attached to the crossarm. The wires run
parallel to each other such that wi ‖ wj for i, j ∈
{1, . . . , 4} and perpendicular to the crossarm such that
wi ⊥ rc. Incoming wires have the same outgoing direc-
tion and are located in the same plane as ∂Sc and ∂Sp.
5. Each pole, crossarm and wire configuration has a re-
stricted volume or protection zone ∂Vz . The protected
zone is made up from two convex polyhedra consisting
of a regular cylinder with radius rz centred on the pole
and a rectangular polyhedron of infinite length, height
hz and width dz . The resulting non-convex polyhedron
encloses the pole, crossarm and wires such that a vertical
cross section resembles the letter ‘T’ (see Fig. 2 and 3).
C. Platform Parameters
Assumptions regarding the platform are as follows:
1. The platform is a modified 6 rotor DJI S800 platform
with maximum takeoff weight (MTOW) less than 10kg
including payload. The platform payload consists of a
computer (Intel NUC), application sensors (RealSense
cameras), autopilot (including GPS receiver, IMU and
barometer) and all supporting telemetry and control links.
2. The platform position pq(x, y, z) defines the location of
the platform centre of mass in FR. The platform position
relative to the infrastructure is defined by the horizontal
distance rq to the pole (or projection of the pole centreline
to ±∞) and the vertical distance ∆h from the xy-plane
located at the same altitude as the crossarm where ∆h < 0
is below and ∆h > 0 is above the crossarm.
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Fig. 3. 2D (xy-planar view) pole, crossarm and wire parameters including
example protection zones () and crossarm region (−−).
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Fig. 4. Example crossarm region coverage for pq(2, 0, 4), φ = θ = ψ = 0
and u = 0. The RealSense field of view () using HC , VC , RC and
crossarm region ∂C () are shown along with the sensor coverage of the
xy-plane at pole altitude ∂Sxy (), sensor coverage of the crossarm region
∂Sc () and sensor coverage of the pole region ∂Sd ().
3. The platform is controlled using velocity commands in the
platforms x, y, z and ψ (yaw) directions. The platform
axis assumes an NED system, whereby the x axis runs
along the platform arm that intersects the FOV of both
onboard camera sensors (see Remark 1 above). The
platform z axis points down from the platform centre of
mass such that its direction is aligned with the gravity
vector in stable hover only.
IV. PERCEPTION
To ensure adequate perception for the assisted control,
both hardware and software aspects are tackled. The hard-
ware aspect involve sensor choice and placement whilst the
software aspect consider algorithms for detection and data
extraction.
A. Sensor Configuration
Sensor choice and placement are important considerations
for inspection tasks. The location of the sensors should be
Fig. 5. Example crossarm region coverage for pq(0.5, 0, z), φ = θ =
ψ = 0, u = 0 with z ∈ {−2.5,−2.0,−1.5,−1.0} (clockwise from upper
left) and RealSense field of view HC , VC , RC . The crossarm region ∂C
() is shown along with the sensor coverage of the crossarm region ∂Sc
() and sensor coverage of the pole region ∂Sp ().
such that the probability of detecting the target object is
maximised, regardless of the platform orientation and before
the application of any additional processing. The analysis
conducted in this section informs the sensor choice and
placement on the platform, by considering a theoretical treat-
ment of the expected operation and associated constraints.
The first analysis evaluates the crossarm detection probability
using typical sensor field of view constraints to derive
suitable protection zone boundaries. The second analysis
uses a modified detection probability metric to enhance the
inspection performance through flight control limitations and
sensor placement parameters.
For the analysis presented in this section, the following
inspection scenario is used. Consider a pole located at
pp(0, 0, 0) with hp = 6 and rp = 0.2. The crossarm and
wire configuration is such that pc(0, 0, 6) with rc = 1.5 and
rd = 0.5. The crossarm and wire orientation ψc ∈ (0, 2pi)
is unknown. Consider also a platform located at pq(x, y, z)
with orientation φ = 0, θ = 0 and ψ = 0. The optical
sensor(s) are rigidly attached to the platform such that the
origin of the sensor(s) coincide with the platform centre of
mass. The platform moves in the x and z direction such
that rq ∈ (0.5, 5.0) and ∆h ∈ (−4, 4) with y = 0. At each
location, the platform may take a maximum (or minimum)
control input corresponding to (φ = ±0◦, θ = ±20◦, ψ˙ =
±30◦/s, v˙z = ±1m/s). The sensor(s) field of view {HC , VC}
is such that −60 ≤ HC ≤ 60 degrees horizontally and
−60 ≤ VC ≤ 60 degrees vertically with a detection range
of RC = 4. To analyse the probability of detecting the pole,
crossarm and wires using optical sensors, the coverage of
the crossarm and detection disc is analysed at each rq ∈
(0.5, 5.0) and ∆h ∈ (−4, 4) with y = 0. First, the bounding
polygon ∂Sxy that defines the intersection points between the
xy-pane at crossarm height and the spherical section defining
the field of view is found. Second the bounding polygons
that define the intersection between ∂Sxy and the crossarm
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Fig. 6. Detection area metric As/Ap with pc(0, 0, 6), rc = 1.5, rd = 0.5
for rq ∈ (0.5, 5.0) and ∆h ∈ (−4, 4). As the detection area metric goes
from zero () to unity (), the sensor covers more of the pole region such
that the probability of detected the crossarm increases, regardless of the
crossarm orientation ψc.
∂Sc and detection ∂Sp region is found. Third, a crossarm
coverage area metric As/Ac and pole area metric As/Ap is
found where As, Ac and Ap are the area of the bounding
polygons defined by ∂Sc, ∂C and ∂Sp respectively. Example
sensor coverage results and parameters for a single location
are shown in Fig. 4, with results for multiple locations shown
in Fig. 5 - 7.
Using these results, a candidate protection can then be
defined such that rz ≥ 0.5, hz ≥ 4 and dz ≥ 2.2 meters.
The regions where the crossarm and wires are more likely to
be detected given sensor constraints are 0.5 ≤ rq ≤ 3.5 and
−2 ≤ ∆h ≤ 2. The important point to note is the relative
distance between the assumed infrastructure parameters and
the protection zones. Altering the infrastructure parameters
will change the protection zones accordingly, so knowledge
of exact parameters allows a solid starting point to derive
specific protection zones for each application or flight.
Using the same set of coverage results, the sensor location
on the platform can be determined. If a single forward facing
sensor (non-gimbaled) is used with its optical axis is aligned
with the platforms x axis, the field of view is obviously
limited and the possibility of missed detection increases
at safety critical times during inspection. As the platform
moves toward the pole, crossarm and wire detection becomes
difficult as they leave the field of view. These effects are
shown in Fig. 6 and 7, where the notion of tilting is captured
by rotating the sensor downward in pitch. An obvious insight
is to then use two optical sensors, whereby one is upward
facing and the other is downward facing with overlap areas
near the x axis. The result is an increased probability of
detection, moving inward, outwards or hovering near the
infrastructure, alleviating the gimbals and providing some
robustness to missed detections (i.e. one camera is required
to detect the asset)
Remark 1: Using the above analysis:
I Two Intel RealSense cameras are mounted such that their
optical axis are offset from the platform x axis by 30◦ and
−30◦. The field of view of each camera is {HC , VC} is
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Fig. 7. Detection area metric As/Ad with pc(0, 0, 6), rc = 1.5, rd = 0.5
for rq ∈ (0.5, 5.0), ∆h ∈ (−4, 4) and θ = 20◦. Notice the lack of
coverage and reduced probability of detecting the crossarm when pitching
up (moving away from the crossarm) and operating near the pole.
−30◦ ≤ HC ≤ 30◦ horizontally and −23◦ ≤ VC ≤ 23◦
vertically. Combining the two cameras gives us a sensor
with a vertical field of view of ±53◦ with a gap of 7◦ in
the middle.
Remark 2: The maximum permissible pitch angle is 20 de-
grees whilst the maximum permissible roll angle assumed to
be 0 degrees. These constraints are based on the assumption
that the platform will be oriented such that the platform’s x
axis points toward the pole centre at all times. For the initial
analysis presented here, the control input at each location
is such that u = 0 so φ = θ = ψ = 0◦ and u = 0 so
φ = 0, θ ± 20◦, ψ = 0◦ in Fig.6 and 7 respectively.
Remark 3: The above analyse can be repeated for any sensor
field of view, infrastructure parameters and platform motion.
The results are to be used a guide to design the concept
of operation and are can be modified for other platform
constraints and refined after a practical assessment of the
sensor performance.
B. Detection Algorithm/Approach
The input to the pole detection algorithm consists of two
point clouds captured using the RealSense cameras on-board,
and the output is the the horizontal distance and the relative
angles to the pole.
The detection process starts by combining the two clouds
using the static rigid transform between the center of the
UAV and the two cameras. Following that, the resulted
combined cloud is passed through a noise reduction stage
that deploy a voxel grid filter followed by a radius outlier
removal. Radius outlier removal calculates the number of
neighbors within a given radius for each point. Outliers are
all points that have fewer than a given number of neighbors
The pole detection algorithm works under the assumption
that the pole is the longest vertical structure in the current
view. Based on this assumption, the points in the filtered
point cloud are used to fill a 2D histogram with a bin of size
25cm × 25cm. This is done by projecting the points into
the x − y plane. The center of the pole is the bin with the
highest number of points count. Given the detected center of
Fig. 8. The filtered cloud with the pole detected. The red dashed line is
the vector between the UAV and the detected center of the pole.
the pole in the reference frame of the UAV, the horizontal
distance and the relative angles to the pole are calculated and
returned to the assisted control system.
Fig. 8 shows the filtered cloud after voxelisation and
outlier removal. It also shows a vector between the center
of the UAV and pole based on the 2D histogram voting
as descried above. The gap in the cloud is explained in
section IV-A, Remark 1.
V. ASSISTED CONTROL
The platform has 2 modes of operation or flight modes -
Manual Mode and Inspect Mode.
A. Manual Mode
The manual mode allows the platform to be controlled
manually and is typically used pre and post inspection task.
The manual mode can be instigated during inspection by the
operator or in the case of missed infrastructure detections,
and is typically used to start, pause (hover) or return from
the inspection task. No assisted control is included such that
u = u˜ = (u˜x u˜y u˜z u˜ω) (1)
Automation in manual mode is inherited from the onboard
autopilot functionality which includes the ability to hover at
a fixed location and heading when no control input is given.
B. Inspect Mode
The inspect mode incorporates the safety features through
assisted control that will alter manual control inputs that
would place the platform inside the protected zones around
infrastructure. Due to sensing constraints outlined earlier, the
inspect mode operates in 4 states or sub-modes. Each state
depends on where the platform is located with respect to
the crossarm and wires and detection status. A description
of each state and associated control input is provided below
with the state transition topology depicted in Fig. 9. In this
paper, we only consider control in the horizontal xy-plane
(3DOF) such that uz = u˜z in all states.
State 1 The inspection mode has been initiated but infrastruc-
ture has not yet been detected so assisted control cannot be
applied. The platform is essentially in manual mode such that
u = (u˜x u˜y u˜z u˜ω), but can automatically switch to states 2-
4 pending relative geometry and sensing performance. This
is not the same as in manual mode, and can be seen as
an arming of the inspect mode. This state is the only state
that can be entered from manual mode. If the inspection is
paused this state is re-entered when inspection resumes, but
may (almost) immediately switch to states 2-4 subject to the
relative geometry and requested control input.
State 2 The platform has detected the infrastructure and the
safety system attempts to orientate the platform such that
the platforms x axis always points toward the pole within
a specific deadband via proportional-derivative yaw control
such that:
uω =
{
Kpψ(t) +Kd(ψ(t)− ψ(t− 1))/δt |ψ(t)− ψ(t− 1)| > τ
u˜ω |ψ(t)− ψ(t− 1)| ≤ τ
(2)
where Kp and Kd are the proportional and derivative gain
terms respectively and ψ is the relative heading angle from
the quad x-axis and the pole centre. The controller allows
manual yaw corrections based on the value of τ ∈ R+ where
tau is the angle between rq and x axis of the platform. The
requested control input is such that there is no collision threat
allowing
u = (u˜x u˜y u˜z uω) (3)
State 3 The platform has detected the infrastructure and the
safety system attempts to re-orientate the platform in the
same manner as state 2. The requested control input is such
that there is a potential collision threat. The safety system
ensures that the platform cannot enter into the protected zone
surrounding the pole such that rq > rz . The operator remains
in control of the inspection task, with the requested control
modified such that:
ux =
{
u˜x(1− 1/e|rq−rz|)v, ψv ≤ η
u˜x, |ψv| > η
(4)
uy =
{
u˜y(1− 1/e|rq−rz|)v, ψv ≤ η
u˜y, |ψv| > η
(5)
(6)
where ψv is the angle between the requested lateral velocity
vector and the pole centre measured from the quad centre
of mass. The angle η defines the angle between the vector
tangential to the inner collision boundary rz and the pole,
measured from the platform.
State 4 The platform has detected the infrastructure and the
safety system attempts to re-orientate the platform in the
same manner as state 2. The position of the platform is
such that there is an immediate collision threat, as the inner
boundary has been breached. The safety system ensures that
the platform exits the protected zone such that rq > rz ,
Manual Mode
On Ground
(Armed)
State 2State 1
State 3State 4
Inspect Mode
Fig. 9. Flight mode transition architecture where one and two-way mode
transitions are shown as well as the inspect sub-modes ().
Operator input is modified such that:
ux =
{
−u˜x(1− 1/e|rq−rz|)v, ψv ≤ η
u˜x, |ψv| > η
(7)
uy =
{
−u˜y(1− 1/e|rq−rz|)v, ψv ≤ η
u˜y, |ψv| > η
(8)
(9)
forcing the platform outside the inner boundary regardless
of the controller input. Importantly, this control design also
guards against collision in the event the operator input is
incorrect due to disorientation, panic or otherwise.
VI. INFRASTRUCTURE INSPECTION
To create a working platform capable of conducting real
inspection tasks, the perception system is coupled with the
assisted control design in a multi-loop control architecture
(nested) operating at different frequencies. The pilot input
defines the reference control input which, depending on
the state, is modified through the high-level controller and
then sent as a reference for the low-level attitude controller
(Pixhawk). The high level controller runs at fH = 1Hz and
the low-level controller runs at fL = 400Hz. This same
control architecture/topology is used in both simulation and
on the real platform. Both simulated and real experiments
are conducted to evaluate the safety system for use in live
inspection tasks.
A. Simulated Results
Simulations are conducted using a simple quadrotor model
(hector_quadrotor [9]) running in ROS and using Gazebo
with an appropriate pole model to provide the feedback
for the assisted control. The manual control uses hardware
in the loop via a real RC transmitter. A simulation is
conducted whereby the platform initially moves toward to
pole, descends, orbits the infrastructure, moves toward the
pole than ascends. The platform state, control input, flight
path and relative distance (range) to the pole are depicted in
Fig. 10(a)-(d) respectively.
Unlike the real experiment that we will detail later, the
perception system in the simulation case is essentially per-
fect, so missed detections are not observed. Thresholds are
placed on the relative yaw orientation and distance to the
pole such that the assisted control can become active during
flight. The simulation results demonstrate two main features.
First, the assisted control successfully alters the control and
consequently stops the operator from moving beyond the
inner protection zone boundary. This is indicated by the
platform moving into state 3 and the control subsequently
converging to zero, even if the operator attempts to move
further toward the pole. Second the yaw control applied in
state 1 through to state 3 ensures that the platform points
toward the pole, resulting in the orbit-like behaviour despite
no control input in the x direction (t ≈ 400s until t ≈ 450s).
B. Real Experimental Results
Flight trials are conducted using real (de-energised) elec-
trical infrastructure used for training purposes in the power
industry. All perception and control is accomplished onboard
(via an Intel NUC), with an offboard laptop required for
setup and two RC controllers used for safety. The master
RC transmitter is always active and used to switch between
manual and inspect modes. The second transmitter is used
during inspect mode and is directly linked to the perception
and assisted control systems. A flight is conducted whereby
the platform starts near the infrastructure before attempting
to move as close as possible on two consecutive attempts
before retreating away from the asset. The platform state,
control input, flight path and relative distance (range) to the
pole are depicted in Fig. 11(a)-(d) respectively.
As the platform is close to the infrastructure, the per-
ception system immediately detects the pole and initiates
automatic yaw control to re-orient the platform toward the
pole. The experimental results support the observation from
the simulated results, but also demonstrate a key safety
feature. Due to missed detections and measurement error,
the platform moves beyond the protection zone boundary
on two occasions as the operator attempts to inspect the
infrastructure (t ≈ 20 and t ≈ 40). The assisted control
responds accordingly, rejecting the operator input and push-
ing the platform back outside the protection zone. This is
indicated by the platform moving into state 4 and with the
control input being the opposite polarity to that requested
until the operator no longer attempts to move toward the pole.
At this time, the control polarity is retained by attenuated
accordingly to ensure non-aggressive behaviour.
Remark: The negative range value in Fig. 11(d) at t ≈ 52s
occurs when the pole moves out of detection range (state 1),
and the platform is essentially in manual mode.
Table I lists the parameters of the system for both the
simulation and the real experiment case.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented a full theoretical analysis of expected
sensor performance and constrained platform behaviour for
the task of assisted control of a small multirotor platform
when performing an aerial inspection of fixed energy infras-
tructure. We show how the theoretical analysis inform the
design of the sensor rig and the choice of the optical sensor
placement. Using the measurement for the optical sensors
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Fig. 10. Simulated inspection flight with pc(0, 0, 5), rc = 1.5, rz = 2.0. Notice the platform state transition when operating near and away from the
pole and the automatic control attenuation (t ≈ 375 and t ≈ 440) if requesting an unsafe input when operating near the pole.
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Fig. 11. Real infrastructure inspection flight with rc = 1.1, rz = 3. Notice the platform state transition to state 4 (t ≈ 20) and (t ≈ 40) and the
subsequent control polarity reversal to move the platform away from the infrastructure.
on-board, the relative position between the platform and the
asset (the electrical pole in our case) is estimated and used
to enable the human operator inputs to be autonomously
adjusted to ensure safe separation.
The development time required from acquisition to imple-
mentation and then successful results was less than 3 weeks.
This is due to the appropriate modelling and simulation. No
incidents occurred during flight, including no control failures,
component failures or inadequate sensing highlighting the
importance of the theoretical analysis during developmental
stages.
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TABLE I
SYSTEM PARAMETERS
†Parameter (units) Simulated Experimental
rz (s) 40 8
rc (s) 0.1 0.05
rp (s) 0.1 0.05
Kp (-) 3 3
Kd (-) 4 4
m (kg) 1 4.62
pp (m) (-2,1,-3) -
